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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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INTELLIGENCE

8 AUG 1972

Honorable George H. Mahon Chairman, Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in reply to the question you have raised concerning tactical intelligence activities within the Department of Defense.

As you know, there are a number of activities which are not included in our major intelligence programs (carried in Program III as the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program) and which perform intelligence-related functions in direct support of military forces. These activities include warning systems, tactical combat reconnaissance units, and information gathering and processing activities organic to the force structure. While some of the functions they perform can be defined as intelligence functions, they are always closely linked with the military forces they support, and their costs are often virtually inseparable from these forces. For this reason, we refer to such activities as intelligence-related, since the term "tactical intelligence" is not adequate to represent the scope of the functions which they perform.

We examine the effectiveness of these activities, make determinations on the numbers and capabilities required, and, when feasible, we use the output of their operations to supplement and, in some cases, to substitute for the work of intelligence activities. While we do not manage or present these activities as separate fiscal programs, since it seems neither sound nor practicable to do so, they are presented for your review in the Defense budget estimates as components of the major force structure programs of which they are a part.

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Perhaps it will convey a better idea of the variety and scope of the functions performed by these intelligence-related activities and the different management relationships involved if I discuss briefly each major area of activity.

An important category is the area of warning. Included here are systems intended to provide timely tactical warning (30 minutes or less) of strategic nuclear attack on the U.S. by bombers, land-based missiles, or submarine-launched missiles. Examples are the 647 satellite and the 440L bistatic radar, designed to detect missile launches at the time they occur, the BMEWS radar, Navy early warning squadrons, and the FPS 78 over-the-horizon radar system, all designed to detect and track incoming raids at extended ranges. The totality of warning systems detects launches, tracks raids, and records impacts as early as possible, and reports this information in very close to real time. These warning activities are under the management of the World Wide Military Command and Control Council (WWMCCS) of which I am a member and which provides policy guidance and direction to warning system development. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes the needs of the command centers and the required information flow, and it is from his recommendations that warning system requirements are established and approved by the WWMCCS Council. We are now in the process of reviewing carefully the warning system programs we will need for the next several years.

A second important intelligence-related area is ocean surveillance. Here are included programs directed at reporting military movements on, over, and under the ocean. The increasing Soviet maritime threat is the primary generator of ocean surveillance requirements and the submarine threat is particularly important. Existing ocean surveillance systems are SOSUS and patrol squadrons, both under Navy tactical command, and both in direct support of anti-submarine warfare.

A third category is photo/electronic reconnaissance for battle support. This includes tactical air reconnaissance systems such as the SR-71 (a program that runs around \$82M per year), Air Force RF-4C squadrons, Marine aerial reconnaissance activities and Air Force tactical drone support. Some of these activities also provide information used in

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making national intelligence estimates, with the SR-71 and Naval fleet support squadrons providing prominent examples of this dual role. The total funding proposed in this category in FY 73 is \$332.3 million.

A final area comprises the various staff and close support activities which provide intelligence estimates and current intelligence to the various command headquarters of the departments and operating commands at each of the multiple levels of command. These are so interwoven with the force structure, both in function and in costs, that management isolation is not meaningful, other than assessment of the manpower requirements.

I hope the foregoing will explain why we find it impractical to conduct separate formal program management of these intelligence-related activities and why we do not draw together these activities in the budget as a consolidated functional package. I would like to emphasize, however, that I do review them for effectiveness and cost. For example, as a result of the review we carried out in 1972 of these activities, in response to the President's request, we reduced our program in some of these areas by over \$100 million.

I will be happy to provide any further information that you feel the Committee needs.

Sincerely,

Albert C. Hall

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